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NOW IT'S PERSONAL: WITHDRAWING
THE FIFTH AMENDMENTS CONTENT-BASED
PROTECTION FOR ALL PRIVATE PAPERS IN
UNITED STATES v. DOE*
INTRODUCTION
For the past twenty years fifth amendment jurisprudence
has been in a continual state of uncertainty regarding the
circumstances that compel an individual to bear witness
against herself.' Jurists and legal scholars historically have
interpreted the Fifth Amendment, which states in part that no
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself,"2 as prohibiting the government from compel-
ling an individual to surrender his or her private papers, re-
gardless of whether such papers are business-related or per-
sonal. This interpretation of a privilege based solely on docu-
ment content ("content-based" privilege) is rooted in the vigor-
ously held belief that an individual's private papers are an
extension of that person's mind and thoughts.' Thus, because
* 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994) [hereinafter Doe
111]. This Comment discusses three cases entitled United States v. Doe. In an
effort to avoid confusion, the 1984 Supreme Court case is referred to as Doe I, the
1988 Supreme Court case as Doe II, and the principle case, the Second Circuit
case, as Doe III.
1 Since 1976, when the Supreme Court held that private business papers were
no longer entitled to fifth amendment protection based on their content, Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), lower courts have been unsure about how to
treat private non-business documents. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Fisher and its impact on fifth amendment law.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
' Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-30 (1886) (private papers are one's
"dearest property" and forcible extortion of them is an invasion of one's "indefeasi-
ble right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property") (quoting
Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765)); see also In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 741 F. Supp. 1059, 1068 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Boyd im-
plies that "one's papers can be an extension of oneself'); Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITr. L. REv. 27, 39
(1986) (Boyd probably survived for so long because it was premised upon a "kernel
of truth [c]ertain intimate personal documents-a diary is the best example-are
like an extension of the individual's mind .... Forcing an individual to give up
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of their nature, such papers carry with them an inherent and
sacred privacy right.4 Allowing the government to forcibly gain
access to such documents would violate a fundamental purpose
of the Constitution: to protect the individual from the abuse of
power by the State.5 When the Framers drafted the Fifth
Amendment, they were acutely aware that without effective re-
straint governments tend to intrude upon the private domain
of their citizens.6
Recently, the Supreme Court has reconsidered its interpre-
tation of fifth amendment protections. Claiming that the Fifth
Amendment neither explicitly nor implicitly guarantees any
privacy right, and that voluntarily created business documents
are not by their nature "compelled," the Supreme Court in-
possession of these intimate writings may be psychologically comparable to prying
words from his lips."); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Pro-
tected Privacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945,
986 (1977) (a person's recordings of his intimate feelings tend to be extremely
revealing of his personality).
4 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976) ("the privilege truly
serves privacy interests"); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1974) (the
Fifth Amendment respects an "inner sanctum which necessarily includes an
individual's papers"); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52,
55 (1964) (the fifth amendment privilege evolved from the right of each individual
"to a private enclave where he may lead a private life") (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (1956) (dissenting opinion)); see also Arthur Y.D.
Ong, Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege and Compelled Production of Corporate
Papers After Fisher and Doe, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 935, 940 (1986) (according to
Boyd a primary purpose of the Fifth Amendment was to protect individual priva-
cy). See generally, Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena
Duces Tecum: The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARV. L. REV. 683
(1982) [hereinafter Aftermath of Fisher]; Note, supra note 3.
6 Note, supra note 3, at 971-72 (traditionally, the Fifth Amendment has been
interpreted as protecting the "privacy, dignity, and autonomy of the individual
against the overbearing intrusion of the government").
Discussing the development of the fifth amendment privilege in the
American colonies, one author wrote:
The colonists' experiences with England's oppressive government left them
in fear of the potential abuses of the common law . . . . By this time,
resistance to the oath of inquiry had become prevalent and the right to
remain silent was addressed in almost every state constitution ...
[d]espite differences in the wording . . . of the . . . various constitutions,
they were all nevertheless directed at one primary purpose: prohibiting
the compelled extraction of incriminating statements from the accused.
Lisa Tarallo, Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The
Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to Put an End to Its Silence
On the Rationale Behind the Contemporary Application of the Privilege, 27 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 137, 141 (1992).
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creasingly has limited the application of the Fifth Amendment
to an "act-of-production" privilege. This theory protects person-
al papers only when the compelled act of producing the docu-
ment itself might constitute incriminating testimony.7 Despite
the Court's recent emphasis on this "act-of-production" privi-
lege and its de-emphasis of content-based privileges, the status
of voluntarily created non-business documents remains un-
clear. Although the Court recently has had an opportunity to
address this issue, it has declined to formulate a holding that
explicitly addresses treatment of personal documents. As a
result, lower courts have only dicta to guide them in this area.
The Second Circuit is one of the many courts that have
struggled to formulate a more definitive interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment. In United States v. Doe,' the Second Circuit
extended the Supreme Court's denial of content-based protec-
tion for voluntarily created business documents and applied it
to non-business personal papers. The Second Circuit's decision
relied largely on dicta from contemporary Supreme Court cases
to effectively overrule nearly 100 years of precedent. In the
past, even the Supreme Court had been reluctant to espouse
such a narrow view of the fifth amendment protection offered
to private papers. The extreme view expressed by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Doe has serious implications both
for defendants in criminal cases and for society at large.
This Comment first provides an overview of the line of
Supreme Court cases that has eroded the broad protective
power previously attributed to the Fifth Amendment, but that
nonetheless has explicitly refused to dispense entirely with
tradition. Next, this Comment discusses United States v. Doe
and analyzes the Second Circuit's decision in light of the recent
succession of opinions that perch cautiously atop a rickety
fence, balanced only by conflicting dicta on either side. In addi-
tion, this Comment compares United States v. Doe with deci-
sions from other circuit courts. As these lower courts struggle
to align themselves with what is at best a confusing Supreme
Court interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, they arrive at
' Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). For a more detailed discussion
of Fisher and a further explanation of the act-of-production privilege, see infra text
accompanying notes 20-25.
8 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993); cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).
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one of three conclusions: 1) the Supreme Court has not dis-
pensed with protection of the contents of private papers; 2) the
Court has eliminated such protection (as the* Second Circuit
has concluded); or 3) it is best to avoid confronting the issue
altogether, since the Supreme Court itself has not addressed it.
This Comment concludes that based on the nature of their
content, personal papers should be protected from forced dis-
closure. Prior to 1976, the Supreme Court had accepted the
view that the Fifth Amendment protected highly private docu-
ments. Thus, precedent supports the argument that protection
based on the content of personal papers historically was at the
heart of the Fifth Amendment and remains so today.' Finally,
this Comment suggests a narrow exception for retaining a
content-based privilege for purely personal papers, with the
hope that the courts will adopt a uniform view of the Fifth
Amendment, true to the privacy interests that form its core.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Setting of Boyd v. United States
The Supreme Court has been chipping away at the very
foundations of the Fifth Amendment since Fisher v. United
States," where it shifted the focus of fifth amendment inter-
pretation from one of shielding from production certain docu-
ments with private content into an inquiry as to whether the
actual act of producing such documents could constitute in-
criminating testimony in itself. The Court justified this dimi-
nution of the amendment's language, thereby furthering a
policy of efficient investigation of crime.' Given this reason-
ing, some courts have dismissed as irrelevant nearly one hun-
dred years of precedent.
Fifth amendment jurisprudence began with the landmark
case of Boyd v. United States, which itself relied on principles
9 See supra note 4.
10 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
" Fisher, 425 U.S. at 400. In particular, the Court has noted the importance of
aiding law enforcement in its effective prosecution of white collar crime. See Unit-
ed States v. Braswell, 487 U.S. 99, 100 (1988) (expressing reluctance to recognize
a fifth amendment privilege when it would have a "detrimental impact on the
Government's efforts to prosecute 'white collar crime").
[Vol. 60:553
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first evoked by the drafters of the Constitution. 2 In Boyd, the
defendants were convicted of fraudulently importing cases of
plate glass in violation of customs law. 3 The conviction re-
sulted largely because the defendants had been forced to pro-
duce an incriminating invoice that pertained to a separate
group of cases that appellants had imported earlier.' The
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment and re-
manded the case, finding that forced production of the invoice
violated fifth amendment protections. 5
According to the Boyd Court, there was no difference be-
tween seizing a person's private documents for use as evidence
against him and "compelling him to be a witness against him-
self."6 The Court explained that the policy protecting an indi-
vidual from being forced to testify against herself had original-
ly developed out of a fear that the means used to compel such
testimony would fall upon "'the innocent as well as the guilty"'
and "'would be both cruel and unjust.'""' At the time of the
Fifth Amendment's drafting, the use of violent means by a
government to procure testimony had been accepted practice
since the thirteenth century, when the ecclesiastical courts of
England conducted torture sessions to elicit confessions. 8 The
Boyd Court stated that the Fifth Amendment had been de-
signed specifically to prohibit this sort of behavior. 9
12 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
z' United States v. Boyd, 24 F. 692 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885)
1 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618. For an in-depth treatment of the background of
Boyd, see Alito, Jr., supra note 3, at 31-33. The stage was set for Boyd by a con-
troversial statute, passed during the Civil War, which "authorized the issuance of
warrants to search for and seize 'invoices, books or papers' relating to the impor-
tation of goods without payment of proper duties." Id. at 31. In 1874, the statute
was modified to authorize courts to order persons under investigation to produce
such documents for inspection.
11 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618.
10 Id. at 633.
1? Id. at 629 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029
(1765)).
18 Torallo, supra note 6, at 139-140. During a procedure known as the "oath ex
officio," the accused was forced, often by torture, to give an oath "pledging to give
truthful answers to whatever questions may be asked by the court." Id. at 139.
Thus, the oath ex officio was a "compulsory interrogatory practice," designed to
ensure that the officials would obtain a confession. Id.
19 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630. The Court went on to say that the compulsory pro-
duction of private papers is not only "contrary to the principles of a free govern-
ment," but is "abhorrent to the instincts of an American," and "cannot abide the
pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom." Id. at 632.
1994]
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The Court explained. further that the privilege against
compelled confessions contributes to "the very essence of con-
stitutional liberty and security" and that it applies "to all inva-
sions on the part of the government and its employ~s of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."2 As a re-
sult of the Court's concerns, it developed the idea that the
judiciary should construe the Fifth Amendment liberally to
provide for the "security of person and property." This liberal
interpretation has remained undisturbed for nearly 100
years.2
1
B. Fisher's Shift of Emphasis
Starting in 1976, the Supreme Court altered its interpreta-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. The Court in Fisher v. United
States, held that an accountant had to produce subpoenaed tax
records held on behalf of a client who was under investigation
for tax fraud. The Court reasoned that such records were
not protected from disclosure by the Fifth Amendment because
they were not prepared by the client and, therefore, he was not
in a position to attest to their authenticity.23 Furthermore,
Justice White's majority opinion stated that the Fifth Amend-
ment was never intended to protect the contents of voluntarily
created documents 2 if there was no compulsion involved in
creating them.2 ' Thus, the Court held that the Fifth Amend-
20 Id. at 630.
21 Id. at 635. Because the text of the Fifth Amendment is ambiguous on its
face and fails to define the parameters of what it means to be a "witness" or
what sort of testimony is considered to be "compelled," the liberal construction
assumes that one can be compelled to be a witness against oneself via oral or
written testimony at any point during a criminal investigation. A strict con-
structionist might however, argue that the amendment only refers to oral testimo-
ny, taken on the stand during a criminal trial or hearing.
425 U.S. 391 (1976).
23 Id. at 413.
24 Id. at 401 ("We adhere to the view that the Fifth Amendment protects
against 'compelled self-incrimination, not the [disclosure of] private information.'")
(quoting United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233 n.7 (1975)).
25 Id. at 409-10. As Justice White emphasized, "The preparation of all the pa-
pers sought in these cases was wholly voluntary, and they cannot be said to con-
tain compelled testimonial evidence, either of the taxpayers or of anyone else." Id.
In his concurrence, however, Justice Brennan made the important point that the
compulsion element in the Fifth Amendment does not really relate to the creation
of the document (i.e., whether it was voluntarily created) but to the act of produc-
[Vol. 60:553
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ment only affords protection where the act of producing certain
documents is compelled, testimonial in nature, and incriminat-
ing. 6 Specifically, an individual may assert the fifth amend-
ment act-of-production privilege, only if producing certain sub-
poenaed documents would prove to the prosecution that the
documents exist, are in his possession, or -are authentic, and
that proof of such possession, existence or authenticity would
enable the prosecution to convict the individual."
The first case to apply and extend the Fisher analysis was
United States v. Doe28 ("Doe 1"). Doe I involved several grand
jury subpoenas that ordered respondent, a sole proprietor of a
number of businesses, to produce extensive business records
from several of his companies. The Supreme Court, relying
on its Fisher analysis, found that the contents of business
records usually are created voluntarily and therefore lack the
requisite element of compulsion that would permit a content-
based privilege." The Court ignored the Third Circuit's efforts
to equate a sole proprietor's business records with an
individual's personal records;3' rather, throughout its opinion,
the Supreme Court referred to the subpoenaed records exclu-
sively as "business documents."
After holding that the contents were not privileged, the
ing the document. In his words, "it is the compelled production of testimonial evi-
dence, not just the compelled creation of such evidence, against which the privilege
protects." Id. at 423 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan's understanding of
the Fifth Amendment is practical but has been largely ignored in favor of the
unusual reading encouraged by the Fisher Court-that any document voluntarily
created cannot be considered compelled. However, one might justifiably question,
as Justice Brennan would, what the creation of a document (unless the creation
was forced) has to do with whether or not the document's creator is being com-
pelled to reveal its contents? The Fisher Court's reading is a strained effort to
eliminate any privilege based on a content-privacy argument since virtually all
documents, especially those with personal content, are created voluntarily.
26 425 U.S. at 410 (defining the scope and application of the act of production
privilege). See also Kenneth J. Melilli, Act-of-Production Immunity, 52 OHIO ST.
L.J. 223 (1991), for a detailed dissection and discussion of the act-of-production
privilege as set forth in the Fisher analysis.
27 Melilli, supra note 24, at 236.
28 465 U.S. 605 (1984) [hereinafter Doe 1].
29 Id. at 606-07.
0 Id. at 611-12. Note that the Court's words, "the contents of business records
ordinarily are not privileged because they are created voluntarily and without
compulsion," would imply that there are situations in which the contents, even of
business documents, are protected. Id. at 609 (emphasis added).
", In re Grand Jury Empaneled Mar. 19, 1980, 680 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1982).
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Court contemplated whether the act of producing the docu-
ments could be considered privileged. Based on the district
court's factual finding, the Supreme Court concluded that not
only would production of these records be compelled by the
subpoena but, unlike in Fisher, the act of production would
involve testimonial self-incrimination.32 In Doe I, because re-
spondent voluntarily created the documents at issue, producing
them not only would be "tacitly [admitting] their existence and
his possession,"33 but also would be authenticating the docu-
ments to the government's benefit.34
To avoid an in-depth analysis of the case, the Court rea-
soned that cases like Doe I are inherently fact-specific." The
Court, however, chose to extend Fisher by holding that the
contents of an individual's business records, even when in his
possession, are not protected by the Fifth Amendment." The
Court then stated that, absent evidence to the contrary, in
future cases it would defer to a district court's finding on
whether or not production would violate the Fifth Amend-
ment.3 Significantly, although the Court accepted the argu-
ment that a sole proprietor was not protected from having to
produce voluntarily prepared business records based on their
content, once again it declined to address the issue of volun-
tarily prepared personal papers.
Unlike the majority, Justice O'Connor directly confronted
the destiny of voluntarily prepared personal papers in her
brief, but dramatic, concurring opinion. According to Justice
32 465 U.S. at 613-14. Document production is considered to be "testimonial"
when it is, in effect, a communication by the accused that admits to the "exis-
tence, possession or control, and the authentication of the subpoenaed documents."
Torallo, supra note 6, at 150. But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966) (holding that a compelled act that merely makes the "suspect or accused
the source of 'real or physical' evidence", such as being compelled to furnish a
blood sample, is not testimonial.)
Doe I, 465 U.S. at 614 n.13.
Id. In other words, had the Court upheld the government's right to imple-
ment a subpoena duces tecum, the government would have been able to prove the
existence of the documents, that the defendant had possession of them, and their
authority in one step.
3 Id. at 613-14.
' Id. at 612. Not surprisingly, the Second Circuit based its decision largely on
a case that also avoided discussion of the contents of an individual's personal
records.
3' Id. at 613-14.
[Vol. 60: 553
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O'Connor, Fisher "had sounded the death-knell for Boyd," and
"the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the
contents of private papers of any kind."8 Although undevel-
oped and conclusory, Justice O'Connor's "death-knell" argu-
ment is important because it has become a convenient device
that lower courts use when they justify withdrawing fifth
amendment protection from the contents of personal papers.
The Second Circuit, in Doe III, is an example of one court that
has relied heavily on Justice O'Connor's concurrence to justify
such withdrawal. 9 This Comment will address the Doe III
court's reliance on Justice O'Connor's opinion later in the
text. °
After Doe I, the next Supreme Court case that narrowed
the Fifth Amendment's protection was Doe v. United States.41
("Doe IF'). In Doe II, the Court held that compelling an individ-
ual to sign a consent form directing foreign banks to release
account information to the government did not violate the fifth
amendment privilege.42 The Court reasoned that the directive
in question could not be considered testimonial because it did
not actually acknowledge that an account in a foreign financial
institution existed or that such an account was controlled by
petitioner.43 Furthermore, the consent was not testimonial
because it did not explicitly or implicitly relate a factual asser-
tion or disclose information. The directive did not state that
Doe had "consented" to the release of the records but rather
that his signature should be construed as consent.44 Thus, the
Court concluded that such an authorization, drafted in hypo-
thetical terms so as not to refer to any specific account, was
38 Doe I, 465 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
See, e.g., United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury 89-4 Subpoena Duces Te-
cum), 727 F. Supp. 265, 269 (1989) (Boyd's protection of private papers is no lon-
ger authoritative); In re Trader Roe, 720 F. Supp. 645, 647 (1989) ("the Fifth
Amendment does not protect the contents of voluntarily prepared papers, regard-
less of their nature"); Paramount Pictures v. Miskinis, 344 N.W.2d 788, 812 (1984)
("a majority of the Supreme Court seems to have gone out of its way in Doe to
hold that the content of a document is irrelevant if the compelled act of produc-
tion, does not itself incriminate the individual").
"' See infra text accompanying notes 72-85, for a discussion of the Doe III
majority opinion.
" 487 U.S. 201 (1988) [hereinafter Doe II].
42 Id. at 214-19.
' Id. at 215.
" Id. at 216.
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merely a "nonfactual statement that facilitates the production
of evidence by someone else" and, therefore, did not offend the
privilege.45 The Court rejected Doe's argument that execution
of the forms and the ensuing disclosure of information by the
banks had "independent testimonial significance" that would
incriminate him,4" and emphasized that compelled execution
of the directive did not reveal Doe's actual intent or state of
mind.4
Finally, the most recent case in this line is Baltimore City
Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, decided in 1990."8
This case involved unusual facts in that respondent sought to
suppress the production of her child, not records or docu-
ments.49  Based on substantial evidence indicating that
Bouknight was an abusive mother, a juvenile court had de-
clared her infant son to be a "'child in need of assistance'.""
Bouknight therefore had to comply with an extensive order
granting the Baltimore City Department of Social Services
("BCDSS") supervisory authority over her. After Bouknight
violated virtually every condition of the order and then failed
to turn her son over for placement in foster care, BCDSS peti-
tioned the court for his removal from her care. Despite numer-
ous court orders, Bouknight repeatedly failed to produce the
child and, subsequently, the court jailed her for contempt.51
The Maryland Court of Appeals vacated the contempt order,
finding that it "unconstitutionally compelled Bouknight to
admit through the act of production 'a measure of continuing
control and dominion over [her son's] person' in circumstances
in which 'Bouknight has a reasonable apprehension that she
will be prosecuted.' 52 After granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals.
The Court paraphrased Justice O'Connor's concurring
opinion in Doe I to support its argument that the Fifth Amend-
ment does not protect the individual from incrimination that
41 Id. at 213.
4' Doe II, 487 U.S. at 207.
4' Id. at 216.
48 493 U.S. 549 (1990).
49 Id.
50 Id. at 552 (quoting the Juvenile Court).
5 Id. at 553.
2 Id. at 554 (quoting In re Maurice M., 550 A.2d 1135, 1141 (Md. 1988)).
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may result from the contents or nature of the object demanded.
Bouknight equated the production of the child with the produc-
tion of a document." Although the Supreme Court agreed
with the lower court, that production of the child could be a
form of compelled, incriminating testimony, it stressed that the
privilege does not apply in non-criminal cases.54
II. UNITED STATES V. DOE55
A. Facts
In 1989, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
was investigating Doe for possible violations of federal securi-
ties laws.5" Part of the investigation focused on the trading
Doe had done for his personal brokerage accounts. To help
further this investigation, the SEC served Doe with a subpoe-
na that demanded that he appear before the SEC and produce
certain documents. One of the documents listed for production
was his pocket appointment book for the previous year.5" Doe
used this book, a daily planner, to "record appointments, social
engagements, chores, phone numbers, and other reminders."58
Doe appeared before the SEC and, upon the advice of his coun-
sel, asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination. Later, however, based upon the advice of new counsel,
he withdrew his earlier invocation of the Fifth Amendment
and complied with the SEC's requests. In exchange for his
5 Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 555.
" Id. at 556.
6' 1 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 1993).
' Id. at 88.
, The semantics used to describe such an appointment book are important.
The defense, lower court and dissent in Doe III all referred to it as a "diary,"
which connotes an intimate document. The Doe III majority, however, character-
ized the book as a "calendar," which has more utilitarian, and less personal, con-
notations. For consistency, this Comment will refer to the book as a "daily plan-
ner"-a term that is more neutral.
Regardless of whether one deems the appointment book to be a "calendar,"
"planner" or "diary," it is still a vital question of fact how the recorder uses the
book. The trier of fact must determine whether what the book is called on its
cover is consistent with its contents. In Doe III, the Second Circuit accepted the
lower court's finding that the planner was private. See infra notes 158-59. Al-
though this Comment has adopted the term "daily planner," it is with an aware-
ness that there are various potential uses, business and/or personal, of such a tool.
" Doe III, 1 F.3d at 88.
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cooperation, the SEC agreed to withdraw the original subpoe-
na, defer decisions about the timing and scope of future docu-
ment requests to Doe, and grant Doe a time extension to re-
spond to any recommendations for enforcement action against
him.5 9
After Doe testified before the SEC regarding the trading of
securities in his personal brokerage accounts, the SEC request-
ed that he produce his desk calendars, diaries and appoint-
ment books, among other things."° Doe complied with the re-
quest and, along with other documents, submitted a photocopy
of the pocket calendar. A cover letter submitted by Doe's coun-
sel asserted that "all copies of documents produced in connec-
tion with the Staff's investigation, including this letter, will be
kept in a non-public file and that access to them by any third
party not a member of the Commission or its Staff will be
denied."61
Doe testified before the SEC for a second time the follow-
ing year.62 The Commission was concerned particularly about
calendar entries for March 7, 1988, an important date in its
investigation. At the conclusion of its investigation the SEC
sued Doe, alleging that he had participated in insider trad-
ing.6
3
During the pendency of the SEC's investigation of Doe, the
U.S. Attorney's office for the Southern District of New York
had requested and was granted access to documents produced
by Doe.' After receipt and examination of a copy of the desk
calendar, the government suspected that Doe had used cor-
rection fluid to "white-out" certain entries in the original ver-
sion prior to copying and producing the documents to the
SEC.65 In October, 1990, based on such suspicions, the grand
jury that had been investigating perjury and obstruction of
justice charges against Doe, issued a subpoena commanding
him to produce the original version of the calendar.66 Doe,
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 89.
62 Id.
' Doe III, 1 F.3d at 89.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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however, asserted his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and refused to comply.
The government informed the court, during a conference,
that it suspected that Doe had altered the calendar. The gov-
ernment argued that it needed the original calendar to perform
physical tests to reveal whether any entries had been covered
with correction fluid. In response, Doe claimed that the sub-
poena was unenforceable because the Fifth Amendment pro-
tected both the calendar's contents and the act of producing it,
and that by providing a copy of the calendar to the U.S.
Attorney's office, the SEC had breached a confidentiality agree-
ment with him. 7 After presenting this argument, Doe's coun-
sel permitted the government to examine the calendar in its
original form. That examination confirmed the government's
suspicion that Doe had expunged many entries, including criti-
cal ones for the date of March 7, 1988.68
At a hearing, the district court denied the government's
motion to compel production of the diary and concluded that
the Fifth Amendment protected the entire, original version of
the diary even if Doe had altered parts of it. The judge rea-
soned that such protection was necessary because the diary
was intimate and personal, no part of the original version had
been published, and Doe had not voluntarily disclosed its con-
tents to the SEC or the Assistant U.S. Attorney.69
B. The Court of Appeals' Decision
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a decision written
by Judge Lumbard, reversed the district court's decision and
denied Doe the act-of-production privilege." The court rea-
soned that compliance with the subpoena in this case would
entail merely "surrender" of the calendar and not "testimony."
Furthermore, the court held that fifth amendment protection
67 Id. at 89. Doe alleged that the government had promised him immunity
("use immunity") if he turned over his diary to them, and then violated that
promise. Id. at 88-89.
" Doe III, 1 F.3d at 89.
" Id. Judge Pollack stated that the copy of the diary and the original version
were different documents and that "the disclosure of a purported copy to the SEC
was not a publication of the original."
70 Id. at 88.
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does not extend to the contents of any voluntarily prepared
documents-whether business or personal.7'
1. The Majority Opinion
After brief reference to Fisher, Judge Lumbard turned to
Doe I and discussed the Supreme Court's ruling that the Fifth
Amendment does not protect the contents of business records
in an individual's own possession.72 Although Judge Lumbard
recognized that the Supreme Court majority in Doe I had ad-
dressed only business documents, the court chose to emphasize
Justice O'Connor's separate concurrence concerniag private
papers.73 Notwithstanding its reliance on the concurrence, the
Second Circuit explicitly acknowledged that not only had no
other justice joined O'Connor's opinion, but that Boyd had
never been expressly overruled.74
Justice Lumbard next turned to the more recent Supreme
Court decision, Baltimore City Department of Social Services v.
Bouknight.75 Like the Supreme Court in Bouknight, Judge
Lumbard emphasized O'Connor's concurrence in Doe I and
held that incrimination resulting from the nature or content of
a document is irrelevant and, therefore, "[wihen the govern-
ment demands that an item be produced, 'the only thing com-
pelled is the act of producing the [item]."'76 The Second Cir-
cuit then dismissed Boyd's extensive discussion of the Fifth
Amendment's protection of private documents, calling it dicta,
and emphasized that the invoices at issue in Boyd were busi-
ness documents.77 The Second Circuit Court reiterated its con-
tention that the Supreme Court was eroding the foundations of
Boyd and that "[s]elf-incrimination analysis now focuses on
whether the creation of the thing demanded was compelled
and, if not, whether the act of producing it would constitute
71 Id. at 93.
72 465 U.S. 605 (1984).
73 See supra notes 38-40 text accompanying text.
7' Doe III, 1 F.3d at 92 (noting that Justice O'Connor was alone in her opinion
but that the decision in Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight in 1990
suggests that the majority would now agree with her).
7' 493 U.S. 549 (1990). See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
7' Id. at 554-55 (citing United States v. Doe, 445 U.S. 605, 612 (1984)).
Doe III, 1 F.3d at 92.
[Vol. 60: 553
NOW ITS PERSONAL
compelled testimonial communication.""5
The Second Circuit, relying on other appellate courts that
had considered similar questions, 9 declared that the Fifth
Amendment should not shield the contents of voluntarily pre-
pared documents, whether business or personal."0 Although
the Second Circuit conceded that the diary was a highly pri-
vate document, it nonetheless refused to apply a content-based
analysis on the ground that such an analysis was no longer
relevant."' Thus, without any content-based privilege, the
Fifth Amendment could not shelter the daily planner from the
government's scrutiny.
Finally, the court confronted the issue of whether the
compelled act of producing the diary should be viewed as testi-
monial and self-incriminating. It found that Doe had no act-
of-production privilege because he had already produced a copy
of the diary for the SEC and had testified about his use and
possession of it. Therefore, the court reasoned, the diary's exis-
tence was a "foregone conclusion,"" and production of the
original would not add anything to the government's informa-
tion.'4 In essence, production of the document meant Doe was
merely surrendering it because the government already knew
of the calendar's existence and of its location. Furthermore, the
court found that Doe's compliance with the subpoena could not
be said to "implicitly authenticate" the calendar since the gov-
ernment could authenticate the document itself, by first estab-
78 Id.
"' See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1843 (1993); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983, 985 (4th
Cir. 1991) (contents of appointment books and records relating to vacation home
not privileged under Fifth Amendment); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (privilege "does not cover the contents of any voluntarily prepared re-
cords, including personal ones"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419 (9th Cir. 1985) (contents of business and
personal documents are not privileged "in the absence of some showing that cre-
ation of the documents was the product of compulsion"). Despite the Second
Circuit's interpretation, the Fourth Circuit, in Wujkowski, explicitly declined to
decide whether the documents in question were business or personal. 929 F.2d at
986.
" Doe III, 1 F.3d at 93 ("the contents of voluntarily prepared documents are
not privileged").
81 Id.
82 Id.
3 Id.
" Id. at 93 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976)).
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lishing to the grand jury or trial jury that Doe had already
produced a copy to the SEC, and then by allowing the jury to
compare the copy with the original.85 Thus, according to the
government, the production of the diary would not be a form of
testimony and would not be entitled to shelter under the in-
creasingly smaller umbrella of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
2. The Dissent
Judge Altimari issued a scathing dissent, 6 strongly at-
tacking the majority's position that document content could no
longer be the basis for invoking the fifth amendment privi-
lege.87 Emphasizing that Justice O'Connor stood alone in her
interpretation of Boyd, and that the case had not been over-
ruled in nearly a century, the dissent championed Boyd's cur-
rent validity, especially its pronouncement that "compulsory
production of the private books and papers of the owner of
goods sought to be forfeited ... is compelling him to be a wit-
ness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment."8 Judge Altimari further chastised the Second Circuit
for its cramped interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, finding
that the majority's reading violated the very principles upon
which the Amendment was founded:
To hold that a person must divulge self-incriminating state-
ments merely because she chose to write them down rather than
keep them sealed in her head, is to strip the fifth amendment privi-
lege of its intended power. Prying open a personal diary and forcing
its writer to reveal her innermost thoughts, however incriminating
they may be, would no doubt be as reprehensible to our forefathers
as prying open a person's lips to extract a confession.89
Lest his argument be dismissed as an emotional appeal to the
" Doe III, 1 F.3d at 93.
86 Id. at 95-96 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
' Judge Altimari argued that the Court's analysis in Fisher left open whether
it would "apply the voluntariness analysis to personal papers," and emphasized
that although aspects of Boyd have recently come into question, Boyd's "pronounce-
ment that personal papers are protected by the Fifth Amendment has never been
expressly overruled. Its reasoning should therefore continue to be applied until the
Supreme Court directs us to do otherwise."). Id.
Id. at 95 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35).
Id. at 96.
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sanctity of history, Altimari stressed that a number of circuits
either had not yet spoken about the status of personal docu-
ments or seemed to favor privileged status for those docu-
ments. 0
Judge Altimari also distinguished the Supreme Court
cases relied upon by the majority. First, he noted that the
Fisher Court had explicitly stated that it would not venture
near the question of whether private papers could be compelled
because the facts of the case before it did not involve personal
documents. Similarly, Doe I also had involved only business
documents. Furthermore, in Doe I, Justices Marshall and
Brennan wrote separate opinions stressing their understanding
that "the Fifth Amendment still protects the contents of cer-
tain personal documents."9 Finally, because Bouknight in-
volved the production of a child and not personal papers, the
dissent considered the two cases to be "incomparable."92 In
summary, although he recognized the development of a nar-
rower reading of the Fifth Amendment, Judge Altimari urged
the courts to leave room for an exception for personal pa-
pers.93
III. ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit's decision in Doe III differs consider-
ably from the Supreme Court majority opinions in Fisher, Doe
I, Doe I, and Bouknight in that the Second Circuit chose to
read the Fifth Amendment even more narrowly than the Su-
preme Court. In the Supreme Court cases, the dissenting opin-
ions of Justices Marshall, Stevens and Brennan offer a persua-
sive argument for retaining a liberal reading of the Fifth
Amendment that closely links privacy rights with the content
of personal papers. As a result of the Supreme Court's failure
to clarify its view of the Fifth Amendment regarding the con-
tent of personal papers, the holdings in various circuit court
" See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184, 1187 n.6 (11th Cir.
1991); United States v. Mason, 869 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1989); In re Steinberg,
837 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1988); Butcher v. Bailey, 753 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.
1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1042 (3d Cir. 1980).
" Doe III, 1 F.3d at 95.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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decisions lack uniformity, and even conflict with one another.
The diverse approaches of these other circuit courts suggest
alternatives to the Second Circuit's drastic measures. Because
of their sensitive nature and underlying purposes, private
papers have a special need for fifth amendment protection
based on content alone.
A. Opposing Views of Privacy: The Supreme Court and the
Second Circuit
To better understand and counter the Second Circuit's
rationale, it is necessary first to examine closely the Supreme
Court's internal debate over the Fifth Amendment. Perhaps
the most important aspect of the Supreme Court majority
opinions in Fisher, Doe I, Doe II, and Bouknight is the Court's
failure to recognize directly the private nature of voluntarily
prepared personal documents.
The Court has criticized the protection of private papers
yet has been unwilling to reject the privilege entirely. For
example, in Fisher, Justice White stated that "the prohibition
against forcing the production of private papers has long been
a rule searching for a rationale consistent with the proscrip-
tions of the Fifth Amendment against compelling a person to
give 'testimony' that incriminates him."9' Nonetheless, he con-
cluded that the Court need not address the issue of whether
the fifth amendment privilege would shield taxpayers from
having to produce personal, self-created documents in their
possession since Fisher dealt exclusively with non-private pa-
pers.9
5
Even the Fisher Court acknowledged that protection of
personal privacy, although not absolute, is an important pur-
pose "served by the constitutional privilege against compelled
testimonial self-incrimination."9 After all, according to the
majority, if private papers are not either self-incriminating or
testimonial based on their content alone, there is no need to
invoke the Fifth Amendment. 7 Additionally, the Court recog-
" Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976).
9 Id. at 414.
96 Id. at 399.
"7 Id. at 409 (explaining that preparation of taxpayers' papers was "wholly
voluntary," therefore such papers cannot be said to contain "compelled testimonial
[Vol. 60: 553
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nized that an act-of-production privilege would serve to protect
privacy interests as effectively as a privilege based solely on
content.9 8 According to the Court, even if private papers may
be unprotected from production solely based on their private
nature, they still will be protected if the act of producing them
would verify that they existed and were in the producer's pos-
session. 9 Or, as Justice Marshall explained in his concurring
opinion, because "there is little reason to assume the present
existence and possession of one's most private papers," such
intensely personal documents will tend to retain fifth amend-
ment protection.' 0
In dicta, the Fisher Court apparently was struggling to
merge the "naturalist view" of the Boyd Court-that privacy is
one of the "inalienable rights which antedated the creation of
the state and which were absolutely beyond its con-
trol"L'"-with the modern "legal-realist" view-that "all indi-
vidual claims to right are relative to other societal inter-
ests." 2 Such a convergence of two extremes cannot result in
a logical outcome. The Court's attempt to do so, however, em-
phasizes the powerful pull of the naturalist perspective. De-
spite the Court's perception that the Fifth Amendment cannot
be construed as a "general protector of privacy"-because "pri-
vacy" is not a word mentioned in its text and is "a concept
directly addressed by the Fourth Amendment,"--the Fifth
Amendment does protect important privacy interests. For ex-
ample, Americans, in particular, have viewed the uniqueness
of the individual as an inherent aspect of being human and,
therefore, view the legal protection of this uniqueness as a
moral imperative.'3 To preserve this uniqueness, the State
must protect and encourage the "private aspects" of one's per-
sonality. If certain documents, diaries and journals, for exam-
ple, are not accorded this content-based privilege, creative
output could be chilled as people might become afraid to record
intimate thoughts and ideas that may be unpopular or viewed
evidence").
" Id.
, Fisher, 425 U.S. at 409.
10 Id. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring).
, Note, supra note 3, at 949.
10 Note, supra note 3, at 985.
103 Id.
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askance. °4 In the American political system, the right to pri-
vacy is "closelly] connect[ed] with the uniqueness of the person
and human dignity" and, unless the Fifth Amendment "can be
read as putting a premium on the value of personal privacy in
the face of government encroachment, it is difficult to imagine"
what the Fifth Amendment means.' It follows, therefore,
that the content of personal documents has a sacred tinge, that
the individual has a right of privacy regarding such contents,
and that this right is as vital a concept today as it was over
100 years ago.
The Doe H Court lent further support to this rationale. In
its analysis the majority specifically emphasized that com-
pelled execution of a consent directive did not force the peti-
tioner to reveal his or her inner thoughts. °6 Thus, in large
part, there was no fifth amendment violation because Doe's
consciousness was not invaded.' 7 With this in mind, it is rea-
sonable to suggest that the Doe H Court deemed the disclosure
to be viable largely because the sacred realm of Doe's private
thoughts was not violated-as the situation would have been if
production of personal papers had been compelled.
Unlike the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit in Doe III
did not acknowledge the inherent tension that results when
two very different, but equally compelling, philosophical views
clash. Instead, with a few broad strokes, it dismissed all the
tenets of Boyd as obsolete. Adopting a strict constructionist
reading, the Second Circuit insisted that because the word
"privacy" is not written explicitly in the text of the Fifth
Amendment, there is no reason to suggest that any privacy
' Such a "chilling effect" has been claimed as the basis for extending first
amendment protections. See, e.g., Aftermath of Fisher, supra note 4, at 683 (de-
spite the narrowing of protection offered by the Fifth Amendment, which has re-
sulted from the focus on compulsion, the First and Fourth Amendments "safeguard
values formerly encompassed by the self-incrimination clause"). Id. While "the Fifth
Amendment protects only the communications of those who can claim self-incrimi-
nation," id. at 701, and the Fourth Amendment "prohibits authorities from the
wholesale rummaging through a citizen's papers," id. at 702, reliance on a penum-
bra of protections offered by other amendments only becomes necessary if one
accepts the premise that the Fifth Amendment's privilege has become so weak
that it offers no privacy protection.
... Note, supra note 3, at 987.
'06 See supra note 45 and accompanying text. But see infra note 133 and ac-
companying text for Justice Stevens's dissent.
107 Doe II, 487 U.S. at 210.
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interest underlies the Amendment.' The circuit court major-
ity failed to rebut a century of precedent that consistently has
supported an implicit privacy interest in the Fifth Amendment.
Instead, the court merely insisted that such a perspective is no
longer relevant. With apparent indifference to the active de-
bate in the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit relied upon
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Doe I as its primary support.
Although Justice O'Connor's one-paragraph concurrence
emphasized that "the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no
protection for the contents of private papers of any kind" and
insisted that Fisher "sounded the death-knell for Boyd,"10 9
she stands alone in this assertion. Her sweeping conclusion,
that Doe I put an end to the "fruitless search" for a rationale to
justify Boyd's privacy of papers doctrine, is inappropriate."0
Equally inappropriate is the Second Circuit's reliance on
Bouknight to further support its assertion that a majority of
the Supreme Court now agrees with Justice O'Connor's concur-
ring opinion in Doe L It arrived at this assumption by focusing
on dicta in Bouknight that seems to support O'Connor's con-
currence."' Bouknight, however, is a noncriminal case with
an unusual set of facts: close parallels between Bouknight and
Doe III cannot be adequately drawn. Thus, to make its point,
the Second Circuit depended on extraneous commentary from a
case that centered around an act-of-production problem, not
around the status of voluntarily created non-business docu-
.o Doe III, 1 F.3d at 91.
10 United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11 Id. As Justice Marshall rebutted in his partial dissent:
This case presented nothing remotely close to the question Justice
O'Connor eagerly poses and answers.... The documents at stake here
are business records which implicate a lesser degree of concern for priva-
cy interests than, for example, personal diaries. Were it true that the
Court's opinion stands for the proposition that "the Fifth Amendment
provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any
kind," I would assuredly dissent. I continue to believe that under the
Fifth Amendment "there are certain documents no person ought to be
compelled to produce at the Government's request."
Id. at 619 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
." Baltimore City Dep't Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 439 U.S. 549, 555 (1990). In
dicta, the Bouknight Court cited Justice O'Connor's Doe I concurrence and stated
that "a person may not claim the [Fifth] Amendments protection based upon the
incrimination that may result from the contents or nature of the thing demanded."
Id. at 555.
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ments."' Furthermore, Bouknight did not involve production
of a private document, like a diary. Rather, the case involved
the production of a human being-a separate entity hardly the
equivalent of the contents of one's mind."3
B. Dissension in the Supreme Court: Affirming an Inviolable
Fifth Amendment Right to Privacy
1. The Fisher Concurrences
In contrast to the Second Circuit's opinion in Doe III, Jus-
tice Brennan's limited concurrence in Fisher revealed his acute
awareness of the need to employ the Fifth Amendment to pro-
tect an inner sanctum of privacy.' He agreed with the ma-
jority that the tax records in this case were not protected by an
act-of-production privilege, but emphasized that he would not
agree if they were of a personal, instead of a business na-
ture."5 Furthermore, Justice Brennan viewed the majority's
" Doe III, 1 F.3d at 96.
113 Id. at 95 (Altimari, J., dissenting) ("Bouknight . . . involved the compelled
production of a child, not the production of personal papers."). Judge Altimari
found the two cases "incomparable" because:
The compelled production of a diary, an unpublished, written expression
of one's innermost thoughts, forces the involuntary disclosure of the con-
tents of one's mind. The compelled production of a child, on the other
hand, is in no way its equivalent. A child, although the result of a pri-
vate experience, is produced precisely to take his or her place in the
world. Therefore, although the Court found that the privilege against
testimonial self-incrimination cannot be invoked to prevent the compelled
presence of another person, it can still be invoked to prevent the com-
pelled production of a personal diary.
Id.
114 In Fisher, Justices Brennan and Marshall each concurred with the judgment.
425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 430 (Marshall, J., con-
curring). Their separately written concurrences, however, were extremely limited
and more closely resembled carefully worded dissents. Although they agreed with
the majority that in this instance, based on the specific facts of the case, the
documents in question did not warrant fifth amendment protection, such agree-
ment was based on the finding that the documents were not personal in nature.
Both justices expressed detailed, lengthy reservations to the majority's sweeping
inference that purely personal papers might be cast into an entirely unprotected
realm.
11 In his words, "I do not join the Court's opinion, however, because of the
portent of much of what is said of a serious crippling of the protection secured by
the privilege against compelled production of one's private books and papers." Id.
at 414.
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decision as an erosion of important privacy principles that
Boyd v. United States had settled nearly a century ago."6
Justice Brennan noted that the Court had established the
protection of personal privacy as one of the main purposes of
the privilege against self-incrimination in countless opin-
ions." ' Justice Brennan also recognized a "private inner
sanctum of individual feeling and thought" which proscribes
"state intrusion to extract self-condemnation.""' He empha-
sized his belief that protection of personal privacy should not
be viewed as a mere by-product of the Fifth Amendment, but
as a vital consideration when determining the breadth of the
privilege's protection. Finally, finding little difference between
intruding upon one's personal thoughts and one's personal
writing, Justice Brennan warned that individuals will hesitate
to transcribe their thoughts or memories on paper if there is
reason to fear that their personal expressions may be subject
to criminal inquiry."' It is this inviolate privacy right, as
well as the dangers that ensue from violation of it, that Judge
Altimari embraces in his dissent in the Second Circuit case,
United States v. Doe. It is this same discussion that the United
States v. Doe majority conspicuously ignores, focusing instead
on Justice O'Connor's brief, one-paragraph, concurring opinion
in Doe L
In a separate concurrence in Fisher, Justice Marshall
tentatively agreed with Justice White that there does not ap-
pear to be a significant difference between protecting the act of
116 Id.
117 Id. at 416 ("Expressions are legion in opinions of this Court that the protec-
tion of privacy is a central purpose of the privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation.") (Brennan, J., concurring).
., Fisher, 425 U.S. at 416 (MThe privilege reflects 'our respect for the inviolabil-
ity of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private en-
clave where he may lead a private life".'") (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973)
(The privilege "respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought
and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation."); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) ("The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination
Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment.").
... As Justice Brennan wrote, "The ability to think private thoughts, facilitated
as it is by pen and paper, and the ability to preserve intimate memories would be
curtailed through fear that those thoughts or events of those memories would
become the subjects of criminal sanctions however invalidly imposed." Fisher, 425
U.S. at 420.
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production rather than the contents of documents them-
selves. 2 ° According to Justice Marshall, even without content
protection, in most instances the very same documents will be
allowed production protection-resulting in the same out-
come. 2' However, Justice Marshall was only slightly less
worried by the seeming abandonment of content-based protec-
tion of private documents than was Justice Brennan. Justice
Marshall cautiously hoped that the application of the new act-
of-production theory would result in the same degree of protec-
tion as the Court's traditional focus on document content. 2
Ironically, the Second Circuit's recent analysis in Doe III
proves Justice Marshall's caution to be well-founded. The Sec-
ond Circuit's decision, forcing Doe to turn over his daily diary,
has significantly decreased protection for personal docu-
ments.'23 For example, Doe had not relinquished the original
version of his diary to the Government; rather, it remained
solely and exclusively in his possession. This is important
because the information the Government suspected was dam-
aging to Doe lay beneath areas covered with correction fluid.
Thus, this information was previously inaccessible to the gov-
ernment since it had possessed only those copies provided by
Doe. Yet the Second Circuit still maintained that production of
the diary would not have involved a testimonial communica-
tion and, as such, the diary was not entitled to act-of-produc-
tion protection. According to the Second Circuit, the
government's knowledge of both the existence and location of
the diary were "foregone conclusions," and production of the
daily planner would add "little or nothing to the sum total of
the government's information." This conclusion is curious.
The government sought the original daily planner so it could
12 Id. at 431 (Marshall, J., concurring).
121 Id. at 432. See supra text accompanying note 100.
12 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 432 (Marshall, J., concurring).
1 Note, supra note 3, at 976. Although the act-of-production rationale was
originally viewed by its supporters as "requiring an absolute bar against subpoenas
for private papers," the Fisher Court "decided that application of the privilege
against self-incrimination depended on the 'facts and circumstances of particular
cases or classes thereof' and held that the acts of producing the accountants'
workpapers were neither sufficiently testimonial nor sufficiently incriminating to
allow its invocation." Id. (quoting Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410) (footnotes omitted).
124 United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Fisher, 425 U.S.
391, 411 (1976)).
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scrape off the white-out and read information underneath, yet
the court did not find that any additional information gleaned
therefrom might add to the government's investigation or pos-
sibly provide new factual information. Far from providing no
new information, the planner provided the government with
crucial evidence.
2. Justice Stevens's Dissent In Doe II: Protecting the
Contents of the Mind
Justice Stevens reinforced the view that a vital purpose of
the Fifth Amendment is to protect the contents of an
individual's mind from the prying eyes of the government. In
his dissent in Doe II, Justice Stevens argued that forcing Doe
to execute the directive, which released his account informa-
tion to the government, created "new facts and new evidence"
that the prosecution could then use against him.12 In addi-
tion, by executing the document, Doe would be forced to admit
to having a state of mind and therefore "speak" against his
will. 126 As Justice Stevens explained, by signing the consent
form Doe would be forced to answer "yes" to the government's
question: "Do you consent to the release of the document?"127
Thus, Doe's compelled signature would result in an obvious
intrusion into the contents of his mind, forcing him to speak
against his will and to be a witness against himself. 28
Justice Stevens likened the forced signing of the directive
to the Star Chamber's inquisitorial treatment of the accused-
a treatment that directly contradicts our accusatorial system of
justice. 29 The American accusatorial system developed out of
'- 487 U.S. 201, 221 n.2. See supra text accompanying notes 42-47; see also,
United States v. Frederick P. Hafetz & Roger Parloff, Document Subpoenas and
Fifth Amendment Privilege (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. C4-4169, 1985). The authors theorize that the act of production privilege actu-
ally protects the same types of documents that were protected under Boyd because
the act-of-production protection focuses on "those materials prepared by the wit-
ness himself or under his direct supervision, since such production may constitute
incriminating authentication." Id. at 22.
126 487 U.S. at 219 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 220.
1 Id. "Star Chamber" is defined as:
A court which originally had jurisdiction in cases where the ordinary
course of justice was so much obstructed by one party . ..that no inferi-
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a deep respect for the uniqueness of the individual and from
the belief that the natural person had an inviolable right to
the protection of the realm of his or her thoughts and expres-
sions.' ° Although not explicitly stated, Justice Stevens's
opinion implies a great concern with the majority's apparent
indifference to such individual rights and their disregard for
the accusatorial system. In his dissent in the Second Circuit
case, Justice Altimari echoed Justice Stevens's concern when
he wrote that forcing a person to reveal the contents of her
diary is the same as prying open her lips to force them to con-
fess.13
1
C. The Circuit Court Cases: Products of Uncertainty
A brief survey of other circuit court opinions indicates the
uncertainty left by the Supreme Court in the area of fifth
amendment protections. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, in
a case that recognized the shift of focus from a content-based
privilege to an act-of-production privilege, refused to address
whether personal papers are subject to the rationale that "re-
cords 'voluntarily committed... to writing' are not compelled
testimony."32 The court stated that "this circuit has not yet
addressed the remaining vitality of Boyd with regard to per-
sonal documents."' 3 Emphasizing the void left by the Su-
preme Court, the Eleventh Circuit explained that because the
Supreme Court itself was reluctant to overrule Boyd, it would
leave the issue open.'34
Similarly, the First Circuit acknowledged the erosion of
Boyd's principles but stressed that in Doe I only Justice
or court would find its process obeyed .... In the reign of Henry VIII
and his successors, the jurisdiction of the court was illegally extended to
such a degree (especially in punishing disobedience to the king's arbitrary
proclamations) that it became odious to the nation, and was abolished.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990).
... Doe II, 487 U.S. at 221 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 United States v. Doe, 1 F.3d 87, 96 (2d Cir. 1993) (Altimari, J., dissenting);
see supra note 92 and accompanying text.
12 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 921 F.2d 1184 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
the state could compel a legal secretary, acting as substitute custodian for an
attorney, to produce the attorney's subpoenaed trust account records).
" Id. at 1187 n.6.
134 Id.
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O'Connor had found, at least expressly, that Doe I "sounded
the death knell of Boyd."' In addition, the First Circuit
mentioned that the Fisher court had refused to decide whether
truly private papers should be protected based on their con-
tent."6 Furthermore, the circuit court observed that in Doe I
the Supreme Court had been careful to note that the business
records at issue were not as personal as the documents in
question in Fisher.'37 Finally, the First Circuit concluded that
the documents involved in the case under review-notebooks
kept as records of regularly conducted activity of Lyndon
Larouche's security staff-were not intimate personal papers;
therefore, like the Fisher Court, it refused to express an opin-
ion as to whether the contents of personal papers are entitled
to any protection. 3 '
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Butcher v. Bailey"9 is an-
other example of the confusion engendered by the Supreme
Court's opinions. In Butcher, a bankruptcy court order had
allowed a debtor to withhold records because the contents
might incriminate him. The Sixth Circuit reversed, however,
stressing that the records in question were not personal be-
cause they related to property of the debtor's estate and such
information is not intimate enough "to evoke serious concern
over privacy interests."" Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit did
entertain the possibility that certain contents may still be pro-
tected, at least in rare situations "where compelled disclosure
would break 'the heart of our sense of privacy.,"'4
In contrast to the Eleventh, First and Sixth Circuits, other
circuit courts have concluded that the Supreme Court has
spoken quite clearly on the issue of whether the Fifth Amend-
ment protects voluntarily created private documents. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Wujkowski,"'
allowed the subpoena of appointment books and beach-house
-3' In re Steinberg, 837 F.2d 527, 529 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Doe I, 465 U.S.
605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
116 Id. at 529, 530 n.4.
- Id. at 530 n.4.
118 Id. at 530.
139 753 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1985).
10 Id. at 469.
141 Id. (citing Justice Marshall's partial concurrence in Doe I, 465 U.S. 605, 618
(1984)).
142 929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 1991).
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records. The court stated that prior case law had made it clear
that "[a] person may not claim the Amendment's protections
based on the incrimination that may result from the contents
or nature of the thing demanded.' ' 8
The Ninth Circuit also has spoken against a content-based
privilege. In In re Grand Jury Proceeding,'" the court deter-
mined that the contents of subpoenaed documents were not
protected by the fifth amendment privilege because defendant
had not been compelled to create them.45 Citing Fisher and
Doe I, the Ninth Circuit wrote: "the Supreme Court has now
made it clear that regardless of the precise characterization of
the disputed papers, the contents of [personal business records]
are not privileged under the Fifth Amendment in the absence
of some showing that creation of the documents was the prod-
uct of compulsion." 46
Significantly, although the Second Circuit cites this case
as support for its holding that there is no longer any content-
based protection, the Ninth Circuit specifically addresses only
personal business documents. Furthermore, in Wujkowski, the
Fourth Circuit had declined to comment on whether the docu-
ments in question were business or personal.
Finally, it is important to note that prior to its decision in
Doe III, the Second Circuit had favored upholding Boyd's pro-
tection of private papers. 47 Indeed, several of its decisions
recognized that the Supreme Court had not spoken decisively
against Boyd. For example, when determining whether a diary
was private or business-related, the court assumed that if the
" Id. at 983 (citing Baltimore City Dep't Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S.
549 (1990)).
"3 759 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1985).
14 Id. at 1420.
"3 Id. at 1419. Similar to the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the Eight Circuit has
accepted a narrowed reading of Boyd, yet has not confronted a case involving
personal, rather than purely business, documents. See United States v. Mason, 869
F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1989) (if the Fifth Amendment protects the contents of private
papers at all it is only in exceptional situations).
" See In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187, 1196 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (the Fifth Amendment still protects the individual
from the production of documents deemed personal); Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum v. United States, 657 F.2d 5, 8 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); United States v.
Beattie, 541 F.2d 329, 331 (2d Cir. 1976) (post-Fisher, the Fifth Amendment still
protects "against compulsory production of a paper written by an accused with
respect to his own affairs").
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diary were private it would automatically be shielded from
compelled production. 148 Similarly, in 1985, the court noted
that Fisher had not spoken on the issue of whether the Fifth
Amendment still protects private, non-business documents. 49
In another case decided in 1985, the Second Circuit again
recognized that the Fisher analysis should be limited to the
production of business documents.' The Second Circuit re-
fused to broach the question of whether the Fifth Amendment
shields the contents of non-business related, private papers
because the Supreme Court had not yet addressed that is-
sue.8 ' As a final example, in United States v. Beattie, the
Second Circuit emphasized that despite Fisher, the Fifth
Amendment still protected the accused from being forced to
produce private papers written by him and in his posses-
sion. "'52 Such precedent strongly conflicts with the Second
Circuit's decision to extend the holding of Fisher so dramati-
cally.
D. The Second Circuit's Other Options
As evidenced by the differing approaches among the circuit
courts, the Second Circuit had a number of options instead of
its extreme extension of Fisher. Although appellate courts
usually defer to the factual conclusions of courts below them,
the Second Circuit might have reviewed the lower court's con-
clusion that the daily planner in question was personal. Such
daily planners often consist largely of business entries, with
few personal notations, and thus are more "business" than
personal.'53 In such a situation, any personal entries could be
1.. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 657 F.2d at 7.
.. In re Proceedings Before Aug. 6, 1984 Grand Jury, 767 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir.
1985).
,' United States v. Doe, 767 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1985).
... Id. at 41.
112 541 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae at 4, United
States v. John Doe (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1070).
" See In re Sealed Case, 950 F.2d 736, 740-41 (D.C. Cir. 1991) Then-Chief
Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg discussed at length a functional test to determine
whether a document is business or personal. This test, formulated in Wilson
v. United States, postulates that the availability of the privilege depends more on
the nature of the documents than the capacity in which they are held. 221 U.S.
361, 380 (1911). According to this view, a document that is mixed, containing both
personal and corporate notations, may qualify as a corporate record. Id. However,
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stricken.154
If the Second Circuit had concluded that Doe's diary was
actually of a business nature, it could have avoided making a
sweeping statement that denied protection to all personal dia-
ries and documents. Like the Ninth Circuit, the court could
have categorized Doe's daily planner as a "personal business
document" (as opposed to a purely personal document), which
would not require content-based protection. Or, like the Fourth
Circuit, it could have refused to comment on whether the plan-
ner was truly personal, and thereby avoid altogether the sensi-
tive issue. Admittedly, a policy of avoidance is the least appeal-
ing alternative, but at least it would not result in a circuit
court overstepping the bounds of Supreme Court precedent.155
Finally, the Second Circuit simply could have conformed with
its earlier decisions and accepted the premise that, based on
their inherently private nature, the contents of diaries and
similar personal writings are subject to the protection provided
by privilege against self-incrimination.
E. Private Papers' Special Need for Content-Based Protection
Ideally, the Supreme Court will formulate a policy that
preserves the privacy rights of individuals but does not impede
law enforcement agents from investigating criminal activities.
These goals are possible to reconcile. Legitimate business-relat-
ed documents do not require content-based protection since the
act-of-production privilege provides sufficient protection for
a diary or calendar that contains an occasional notation of a corporate appoint-
ment or activity may remain essentially private and therefore shielded from com-
pulsory production. Id. Finally, in the case of a mixed document "records should
be culled so as to delete or excise purely private notations from a corporate re-
cord, or corporate materials mingled with private papers." Id.
'5 In fact, in its appellate brief, the government argued that Doe's diary was a
business, not personal, document. The district court accepted the defendant's argu-
ment that it was a personal document. Because the district court's decision was
based on a factual issue, the Court of Appeals deferred to the district court's find-
ing. Brief for the United States of America at 6, United States v. Doe (2d Cir.
1993) (No. 93-1070).
"' In Salerno v. American League, 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1001 (1971), the Second Circuit stated that "the Supreme Court should
retain the exclusive privilege of overruling its own decisions, save perhaps when
opinions already delivered have created a near certainty that only the occasion is
needed for pronouncement of the doom." Id. at 1005.
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documents that are not private in nature.'56 Intimate papers,
however, must retain a content-based privilege.
Without content-based protection, the government may
subpoena an individual's private, non-business related writings
during a criminal investigation. In turn, that individual might
assert the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, hoping that an act-of-production analysis would shield his
personal papers from governmental purview. Unfortunately,
courts may accept the government's argument that the exis-
tence, authenticity and possession of the writings are foregone
conclusions, as the Second Circuit did in Doe III. Without con-
tent-based protection, this most intimate of documents will be
subject to scrutiny by the courts. If, after examining the diary,
a court finds that it is not incriminating or even relevant to
the investigation, then it has needlessly examined an
individual's intensely personal papers.
It is possible, of course, to assert the first amendment
right to privacy when an instrument such as one's diary is
involved in a criminal investigation.'57 However, the First
Amendment will not guarantee protection from a subpoena
duces tecum, especially if the government has a legitimate
reason to suspect that certain diary entries will confirm infor-
mation of which it is already aware. Thus, without the addi-
tional protection of the Fifth Amendment, personal papers may
become more vulnerable to the government's purview. Such an
event may be extraordinary, but the mere possibility of such
an intrusion is serious enough to merit attention. In fact, it
occurred in Doe III. The Second Circuit, while deferring to the
district court's finding that Doe's planner was an intensely pri-
vate document, nonetheless refused to protect it.
Furthermore, the special nature of personal papers re-
quires the retention of a content-based privilege because the
possibility of a subpoena duces tecum may inhibit their cre-
ation. Such a subpoena will not necessarily restrain the cre-
... See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
.. See Aftermath of Fisher, supra note 4, at 696-97. "Modern first amendment
jurisprudence recognizes that free speech is an end in itself as well as a means to
promote other goals . . . [plersonal papers, almost by definition, are used to ex-
press a writer's most intimate personal feelings . . . To subject personal pa-
pers . . . to government examination for purposes of criminal investigations would
certainly discourage communications . . . ." Id.
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ation of business records because such records usually are
necessary for the effective functioning of an organization. On
the other hand, there is no similar obligation to create person-
al papers. Private papers therefore are "more likely not to be
written if they may harm the author."15 Likewise, there is a
legitimate concern that without the assurance of content-based
protection people may be deterred from voluntarily committing
their ideas to paper.
Individuals write their thoughts on paper for a variety of
reasons, including the fallibility of memory and the need to
help develop and understand certain concepts. Whether or not
these thoughts are incriminating, their recorders do not neces-
sarily want to share them with anyone. Rather, they may want
to remind themselves of daily tasks, record important events
for memory's sake,'59 or further develop ideas through the
process of writing. It follows then, that forcing Doe to disclose
his daily planner, which functioned in large part as a memory
aid, is an invasion of his thought processes and violates the
Fifth Amendment.8 ° In a society that so values individual
.. Id. at 699 n.88. An example of the chilling effect of such subpoenas is seen
in one senator's response to the Senate Ethics Committee's investigation of Sena-
tor Robert Packwood in response to allegations of sexual harassment. Threatened
by the subpoena of Senator Packwood's diary and the lengthy litigation that was
sure to follow, Senator Trent Lott of Mississippi told the press, "I don't keep a
diary . . . I don't even keep telephone logs anymore; I've been advised not to keep
them longer than a month. I'm going to start throwing away my scheduling logs. I
mean, why take the risk?" Michael Wines, The Packwood Papers: Senate Demands
a Look at the Diaries, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, § 4 (Week in Review) at 2. Al-
though the investigation of Senator Packwood is not a criminal investigation yet,
the impact is relevant here.
Even more sobering is the evidence of how fearful government officials may
be to record their private thoughts. "Been battling with the RTC/Madison. Wrote
two pages about what's going on, suddenly realized that I could be subpoenaed
like Packwood and the most innocuous comments could be taken out of context. So
on that subject, nothing." William Safire, On Keeping Diaries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1994, at A23 (quoting diary entry of Joshua Steiner, a Treasury Department aide
whose fears were realized when his diary was subpoenaed during the Whitewater
investigation). As Safire writes, the Packwood case set a dangerous precedent that
"has turned Washington into an open city for diary snoops." Id. And, "[u]nder the
guise of enforcing ethics, well-meaning zealots have fixed their eyes on hitherto
inviolate private diaries" thus undermining both fourth and fifth amendment
rights. Id.
19 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 741 F. Supp. 1059, 1068
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (personal documents, including a diary and appointment book, did
not have to be produced, in part because they were necessary to offset the "limita-
tions of one's faculties" as memory aids).
160 One might argue that choosing to convey personal, incriminating information
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privacy and expression, it is vital that people not be reluctant
to think through their pens, and not have to risk an invasion
of their private thoughts merely because the fallibility of mem-
ory necessitates that they write things down. 6'
CONCLUSION
Because an individual's inner thoughts become more vul-
nerable to governmental intrusion once they are conveyed to
paper, there is a very real need to retain a content-based fifth
amendment privilege for private papers. Without such protec-
tion for papers that are private in nature, creativity and per-
sonal expression may be chilled, as individuals may justly
hesitate to record thoughts solely for their own benefit or plea-
sure.
As the Supreme Court has not overruled Boyd, but has
instead acknowledged its powerful precedential value, the Sec-
ond Circuit's conclusion that the Fifth Amendment offers no
content-based protection for voluntarily prepared personal
papers is flawed. The Second Circuit's decision has, in effect,
made it acceptable for the government to compel potentially
incriminating testimony by subpoenaing one's private papers.
Such private papers may contain deeply personal confessions.
Whether incriminating or "innocent," one's confessions in per-
sonal papers are the equivalent of private thoughts. The gov-
ernment should not have access to the same thoughts that it
cannot force the individual to utter merely because those
thoughts were recorded for personal use. The Fifth Amend-
ment was designed to protect individuals from such invasions
to a piece of paper is equivalent to "choosing" to confide incriminating information
to a third party (who may just happen to be an undercover agent), and therefore
such confidences are equally admissible in court. Choosing to record a private
thought or confession, however, is not comparable to choosing to share that same
thought with another human being, as it is likely that a privately recorded
thought is not intended for publication or anyone's purview but the writer's.
Therefore, the introduction of a person's writings as evidence against him "is peril-
ously close to forcing him to take the stand. In both cases, he is being done in
against his will by his own words, words which he never chose to share with any-
one else." Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 788 (1994) (emphasis added). Thus a recorder of thoughts, as opposed to a
speaker, cannot be said to have assumed the risk of his expression.
" See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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into their minds. To dispense with such protections, and allow
the government to extract information more conveniently from
criminal suspects, undermines the meaning and importance of
this deeply ingrained law.
The Second Circuit's Doe III decision is merely one exam-
ple of the type of inconsistency that results when the Supreme
Court fails to set forth clear guidelines. To avoid decisions like
Doe, which freely dispose of any privacy interests connected
with the Fifth Amendment, the Court must speak decisively on
this important constitutional issue. It should articulate a
bright-line rule that once the trier of fact has determined that
a document is personal, the document is entitled to content-
based protection and may not be submitted as evidence against
the defendant. The departure from offering such protection to
purely business-related documents is not as urgent as the need
to retain this protection for intimate papers. Business papers,
although voluntarily created, do not require the same special
protections as private papers because they will be created out
of necessity. Therefore, content-based protection is not essen-
tial for ordinary business documents; act-of-production protec-
tion suffices in those cases. Content-based protection remains
essential for private papers, however, and the Court should
retain a narrow exception for truly intimate documents.
Suzanne Rosenthal Brackley
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